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COMMENT
SECTION 1-208: "GOOD FAITH" AND THE NEED
FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
Uniform Commercial Code section 1-208 addresses the acceleration of
an obligation by a creditor upon the belief that the debtor will not satisfy
the debt. In particular, the section states that "[a] term providing that one
party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or
require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure'... only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired."1 Hence, creditors can accelerate obligations
only if they do so in good faith. There has been considerable confusion,
however, concerning the meaning of the term "good faith," and whether it
is properly measured subjectively or objectively.
The trouble of defining "good faith" began at the Uniform Commercial
Code's inception,2 and has now cursed the court system. "Good faith"
under section 1-208 has been read by the courts to mean: 1) a purely sub-
jective standard focusing on the creditor's state of mind;' 2) a purely objec-
1. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1988) (emphasis added).
2. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975) ('The
Elevator has not adduced substantial proof that the Bank's concern about the security of its loans,
whether or not reasonable, was not genuine or that the Bank had an ulterior motive."; Fort Knox
Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964) ("It must be remembered that here we
are dealing with the good faith belief of the bank-that is, its state of mind." (emphasis added));
Van Horn v. Van de Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972).
Even if plaintiff was negligent in not checking to determine whether defendant had in fact
been denied a loan, negligence is irrelevant to good faith. The standard is what plaintiff
actually knew, or believed he knew, not what he could or should have known. Because
plaintiff believed defendant had been denied a loan, and acted in accordance with that
belief, he acted in good faith.
Id. at 961, 497 P.2d at 254; see also Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303 (10th
Cir. 1971); Krana v. Equilease Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 750 (N.D. Iowa 1986);
Anderson v. Mobile Discount Corp., 122 Ariz. 411, 595 P.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1979); Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 13 Conn. App. 712, 539 A.2d 595 (1988); Quest v. Barnett
Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), Builders Transp., Inc. v. Hall, 183 Ga. App.
812, 360 S.E.2d 60 (1987); Mayo v. Bank of Carroll County, 157 Ga. App. 148, 276 S.E.2d 660
(1981); Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 175, 243 S.E.2d 528 (1978); Bartlett Bank
& Trust Co. v. McJunkins, 147 Ill. App. 3d 52, 497 N.E.2d 398 (1986); Van Bibber v. Norris, 275
Ind. 555, 419 N.E.2d 115 (1981); Karner v. Willis, 10 Kan. App. 2d 432,700 P.2d 582, aff'd, 238
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tive standard utilizing the "reasonable man" analysis;4 and 3) a two-part
combination of the objective and subjective standards.5 This confusion is
not restricted to jurisdictional borders; rather, it exists among courts within
a jurisdiction and even within a single courtroom. The result is that:
Acceptable conduct according to one court ... may be completely
unacceptable according to another .... As a result, contracting
parties, and lenders in particular, face inconsistent determinations.
They are then unable to project when the exercise of their rights
under the loan agreements may be deemed in 'bad faith'. Such in-
consistency and unpredictability in a commercial setting signifi-
cantly undermines the goals of uniformity and predictability which
lie at the heart of the U.C.C.6
Kan. 246, 710 P.2d 21 (1985); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 79, 181, 585 P.2d 352 (Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978); Sparkman v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 580
S.W.2d 868 (rex. Ct. App. 1979); State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977).
For a general application of section 1-201(19), see Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car
Exch., Inc., 362 Mass. 797, 291 N.W.2d 603 (1973); General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396,
278 A.2d 193 (1971); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d (Tex Ct. App. 1974);
Richardson Co. v. First Nat'l, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex Ct. App. 1974); Riley v. First State Bank,
469 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
4. E.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979); Sheppard Fed.
Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1969); Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747
(Alaska 1975); Richards Engineers, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Holmes
v. Rushville Prod. Credit Ass'n., 170 Ind. App. 509, 353 N.E.2d 509, withdrawn, 170 Ind. App.
517, 355 N.W.2d 417, reinstated, 170 Ind. App. 518, 357 N.E.2d 734 (1976); Black v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 437 So. 2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Turner, 56
So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1952); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, 184-86, 585 P.2d
325, 328-30 (Ct. App. 1978) (Sutin, J., concurring), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292
(1978); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit, 688 P.2d 45 n.5 (Okla. 1984); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545
P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1976).
5. E.g., Blaine v. G.M.A.C., 82 Misc. 2d 653, 370 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327 (1975) (dual elements:
"whether (1) a reasonable man would have accelerated the debt under the circumstances, and (2)
whether the creditor acted in good faith"); see also, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752,
761 (6th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 520-21, 329 N.E.2d 620, 623-24
(1975).
For a brief discussion concerning the two-tiered test, see Note, Standards For Insecurity Accel-
eration Under Section 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal For Reform, 13 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 623, 634-35 (Spring 1980).
6. Comment, Lender Liability For Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36
EMORY L.J. 917, 928 (1987) (authored by Jill Anderson).
UCC GOOD FAITH
Because the consequences of accelerating debt obligations are so great,
as lenders can lose as much as $18.5 million7 if acceleration is made in bad
faith, and debtors can lose everything they own in bankruptcy if accelera-
tion is made in good faith,' the need for one uniform standard clearly exists.
Part II of this comment will illustrate the inconsistencies developed by the
drafters of section 1-208. Part III will demonstrate the inconsistent applica-
tion of this section by the courts. The concluding sections of the article
present a recommendation and support for that recommendation.
II. GOOD FAITH AND SECTION 1-208
A. The Origin of Good Faith
Although principles of "good faith" can be traced to the Bible9 and
various writings from biblical times,"0 the term "good faith" evolved from
Roman law1' with respect to informal consensual commercial contracts12
7. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming a $7.5 million jury ver-
dict).
Larger awards on appeal include: Robinson v. McAllen State Bank, No. C-1984-84-D (206th
D. Tex. 1987) (award of over $59 million); Kruse v. Jewell, No. 112439 (Cal. App. Dep't Super
Ct. 1985) (award of $46 million).
8. See, eg., M.S.V., Inc. v. Bank of Boston - W. Mass., N.A. (In re Martin Specialty Vehi-
cles, Inc.), 87 Bankr. 752 (D. Mass. 1988); see also Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367,
1376 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[a]cceleration is a harsh remedy with draconian consequences for the
debtor").
9. E.g., Exodus 20:15 ("[t]hou shall not steal"). There is established authority stating that
"[t]his Commandment has a wider application than theft and robbery." J.H. HERTS, THE PENTA-
TEUCH 299 (1960). Referring to the same Commandment, M. Friedlander comments:
There are transactions which are legal and do not involve any breach of the law, and which
are yet condemned by the principles of morality as base and disgraceful. Such are all
transactions in which a person takes advantage of the ignorance or embarrassment of his
neighbour for the purpose of increasing his own property.
Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code- A New Look at an Old Problem, 54
MARQ. L. REv. 1, 10 n.45 (1971) (citing M. FRIEDLANDER, THE JEWISH RELIGION 294 (1891)).
10. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 10 ("[ilet the property of thy fellowman be as dear to thee
as thine own" (quoting Aboth 2:12); "[w]hat is displeasing to thee, that do thou not to others"
(quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbath 31a); and "[t]hou shalt love thy fellowman as thyself"
(quoting Leviticus 19:18)).
In fact, many scholars believe that the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church put religious
and moral ideas into legal form by prescribing the enforcement of high standards of good faith
and fair dealing in mercantile law. See, eg., H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTIONS: THE FOR-
MATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS 344-45 (1983); Comment, infra note 15; 5
HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 79-81 (2d ed. 1937).
11. Comment, supra note 6, at 919.
In the sixth century, Emperor Justinian introduced the notion of good faith in the CoRPus
JURIS CIVILIS ("law of the land"), a chronological compilation of the academic Roman law of
which included the law of the Twelve Tables (promulgated in the stone, 451 B.C.); the law of
1990]
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involving sale, partnership, hire and mandate. 13 When any of the afore-
mentioned consensual contracts were in dispute, and the Roman judges and
jurists decided in favor of the plaintiff, the court directed the defendant to
pay the plaintiff whatever the judge:
[flound to be due ex bonafides, that is to say, in accordance with the
requirements of good faith; and this cast on the judge, or rather the
jurists who advised him, the burden of deciding what the defendant
ought in good faith to have done, in other words what kind of per-
formance the contract called for. This meant that, in contrast to the
stipulation, where all the terms had to be expressed, the parties
would be bound not only by the terms they had actually agreed to,
but by all the terms that were naturally implied in their agreement. 4
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the principle of "good faith"
emerged in Europe as an important part of its mercantile law system. 15 The
growth of commercial transactions produced a class of professional
classical and post-classical Roman jurists; and the ordinances and decisions made by Justinian and
prior emperors. However, Justinian's collection of Roman law was largely ignored until a Roman
lawyer, Irnerious, revived it in the twelfth century. Id. at 919 n.9 (citing H. BERMAN, supra note
10).
12. Consensual contracts were enforceable agreements formed by mere consent between the
parties. See F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE CIVIL LAW 116-17 (1955).
13. Comment, supra note 6, at 919. In particular:
[s]ale was the most extensive of the Roman consensual contracts; it was used for the crea-
tion of obligations to transfer things in perpetuity for a price calculated in money. Hire
comprised all contracts where one person placed anything, including his own services,
temporarily at the disposal of another, and money was to pass, with one exception: con-
tracts for services which created an agency relationship, such as services of a lawyer, fell
not under hire, but under mandate. Partnership comprised all cases where two or more
parties agreed to pool money or other property, knowledge, skill, or experience for a com-
mon purpose. Unlike its counterpart in modern law, partnership under Roman consensual
contracts need not be for profit. Mandate was a form of agency and comprised all cases
where one person gratuitously undertook to carry out a task imposed on him by another.
All in all, the consensual contracts covered virtually every aspect of everyday Roman busi-
ness operations except the loan of money and certain types of security.
Id. at 919 n.10 (citing F.H. LAWSON, supra note 12, at 120-21).
14. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) (quoting LAWSON, supra note 12, at
124-25).
It is important to note that Professor Farnsworth states that "good faith" was used in classical
Roman law in the same sense in which it is used in the Uniform Commercial Code's general
obligation of good faith performance. Its significance was in implying terms in the agreement. It
was not until a later period of Roman law that "good faith" came to be used in the sense of good
faith purchase. Id. at 670. For a discussion concerning good faith performance versus good faith
purchase, see infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
15. Comment, supra note 6, at 920 (citing BERMAN, supra note 10, at 334). "It was at this
period in history that commentators feel that religious and moral ideas 'colored the economic
thought' of the European nations." Id.
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merchants in Europe which required a new body of mercantile law. The
system that developed to meet this new class's needs focused on reciprocity
of rights. Professor Berman16 explains reciprocity of rights as " 'involv[ing]
something more than mere exchange .... [I]t involves, ideally, the element
of equality of burdens and or benefits as between the parties to the transac-
tion-the element, that is, of fairness of the exchange.' "17
By the eighteenth century, English common law had completely ab-
sorbed the mercantile law and its interest in good faith. 8 However, by this
time the term "good faith" was being applied in two fundamentally differ-
ent senses: good faith performance and good faith purchase. 9
B. Good Faith Performance Versus Good Faith Purchase
Transactions involving good faith performance describe the term "good
faith" as having "nothing to do with a state of mind-with innocence, sus-
picion, or notice. Here the inquiry goes to decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness in performance or enforcement."" ° Good faith performance relates
16. Harold 3. Berman is an acknowledged authority in the fields of law and religion, Soviet
law, comparative law, international law, jurisprudence, and legal history. He was a professor at
Harvard Law School and Harvard College from 1948-85. Berman's collection of published writ-
ings reaches about two hundred in number. THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW 337 (J.
Witte & F. Alexander eds. 1988) (comprehensive bibliography of Berman's published and unpub-
lished works concerning law and religion); see also LAW AFTER REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON So-
CIALIST LAW IN HONOR OF H.J. BERMAN (P. Maggs & J. Quigley eds. 1988) (comprehensive
bibliography of Berman's writings on Soviet law, international trade law, and comparative law).
17. Comment, supra note 6, at 920-21 (quoting H. BERMAN, supra note 10, at 344).
The principle of procedural reciprocity was highly developed in the jurisprudence that
accompanied the Papal Revolution. The canon law, in particular, stressed principles of
equity in contract formation. As a pledge of faith gave the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction
over contracts, so good faith (bona fides) was itself a necessary test of the sanctity of the
contractual undertaking.
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 344-45.
18. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670.
19. Comment, supra note 6, at 921 (citing Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670); accord Eisen-
berg, supra note 9, at 9; Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:
Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial Institutions?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1202 (1987) (au-
thored by Patricia Milon). Professor Farnsworth stated:
While the varieties of good faith are not quite as infinite as those of religions faith, it would
be quite extraordinary if this protean concept were used in the same sense in all of these
assorted instances. We may count ourselves fortunate that we need speak of good faith in
but two senses.
Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 668.
20. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 668.
Some illustrative Code sections governing good faith performance follow:
1) U.C.C. §§ 2-305(2) and 2-311(1) (1988) state that when a term, price or performance is
left open to be fixed at a later date, the party is to fix them in good faith.
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back to the Roman application of good faith,21 "resulting in an implied
term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the
contract so that another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expec-
tations."2 2 Meanwhile, in transactions that require a good faith purchase,
good faith "is used to describe a state of mind: A party is advantaged only
if he acted with innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion. This meaning of
'good faith' is very close to that of lack of notice."2 3 The good faith
purchase standard developed in the English courts by the early 1800s as a
response to the growing desire for free trade of goods and the marketability
of commercial paper.24
2) U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1988) requires that seller's output or buyer's requirements be in
good faith.
3) U.C.C. § 2-603(3) (1988) provides that a merchant buyer must effect salvage in good
faith when left in possession of rightfully rejected goods.
4) U.C.C. § 9-318(2) (1988) allows modifications to be made to a contract when they are
made in good faith.
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Farnsworth, supra note 20, at 669.
23. Id. at 668.
Professor Farnsworth also cites illustrations of good faith purchase within the Uniform Com-
mercial Code:
1) U.C.C. §§ 3-205 and 3-302 (1988) provide a holder in due course status to a good faith
purchaser of a negotiable instrument.
2) U.C.C. § 2-403(l) (1988) gives good title from a seller whose own title was voidable due
to fraud if buyer purchased the item in good faith.
3) U.C.C. § 7-404 (1988) gives protection to a warehouseman or carrier on the receipt of
stolen goods if he receives and delivers the goods in good faith.
4) U.C.C. § 3-417(l)(c) (1988) affords the drawee bank protection from the acceptance
and subsequent payment as an altered check if the drawee bank paid in good faith.
Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 668 nn. 13-16. See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
24. Comment, supra note 6, at 921-22 (citing Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670).
In Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B. 1801), the King's court ruled that a
holder of a negotiable instrument need not make a diligent inquiry upon negotiation. Farnsworth,
supra note 14, at 670 (citing Lawson, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng Rep. 640). To require such an inquiry
"could be at once to paralize the circulation of all the paper in the country." Id. (quoting Lawson,
4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640). Thus, Lord Kenyon introduced the subjective test of good faith -
"the test of the 'pure heart and the empty head.'" Id.
In Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824), however, the subjective test
was discarded for an objective test - the prudence and caution of a reasonable man. Farnsworth,
supra note 14, at 640.
However, by 1836 Gill had been overruled by Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870, 111 Eng.
Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836). Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670.
For an in-depth analysis of the development of the good faith standard for good faith purchase
specifically as it relates to negotiable instruments law, see Comment, Holder in Due Course - - The
Requirements of Good Faith and Notice, 28 MD. L. REv. 145 (1968); see also W. BRITTON, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 246 (2d ed. 1961); W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 196-200 (1967);
UCC GOOD FAITH
By the end of the nineteenth century most American states had adopted
the same subjective standard for good faith purchase.25 "As a result of the
attention directed toward good faith purchase and the neglect of good faith
performance, two general misconceptions arose: first, that the obligation of
good faith governed only purchase and, second, that the only proper test of
good faith was a subjective one."26
By the end of the twentieth century, "good faith" had long been incor-
porated into various laws within the United States.27 Field used it in draft-
ing his New York Civil Code;28 Chalmers in the British Bills of Exchange
and Sales of Goods Acts; Crawford in the Negotiable Instruments Law;29
and Williston in the Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
and Uniform Bills of Lading Act.30 The drafters of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code made frequent references to the standard of good faith.31 Indeed,
there are several federal statutes that reference a good faith standard.32
However, the notion of good faith was largely limited to good faith
Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 18 MICH. L. REv.
355 (1920).
25. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670 (citing Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343, 367-70
(1857)).
Out of approximately fifty references to good faith contained in the uniform acts, not once is
the standard used in the sense of good faith performance. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 671.
26. Comment, supra note 6 at 922-23 (citing Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 670).
27. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 667.
28. "The offer of performance must be made in good faith by the party owing performance to
the party who is entitled to the same, and the former must be ready and willing to perform his
obligation...." Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 667 n.6 (quoting FIELD'S CIVIL CODE § 642 (New
York State Commissioners' Draft of a Civil Code for the State of New York (1862)))
29. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 667.
30. Specifically, see § 76(2); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECIEPTS Aar § 58(2); UNIFORM BILLS
OF LADING AT § 53(2). Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 210 n.61 (1968).
31. There is express mention of "good faith" requirements in about fifty of the four hundred
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 667.
32. Id; see, e-g., Bankruptcy Act § 141, 52 Stat. 887 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1958) (petition
for bankruptcy must be fied in good faith); Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b) 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958) (a seller may discriminate if his price was set "in good faith" to meet com-
petition); Automobile Dealer Day in Court Act § 2 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958)
(the dealer may recover damages sustained because of the manufacturer's failure to act in "good
faith"); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 8(d) 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958) (employer and union are bound to "confer in good faith"); Farnsworth,
supra note 14, at 667 nn. 7-10.
In fact, for over a decade it has been the custom for graduating students of the University of
Chicago Law School to take the "Karl Llewellyn" pledge: "'[each will] work always with care
and with a whole heart and with good faith."' Id. at 667-68 (quoting the Chicago Lawyer's
Pledge, LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE - REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 395 (1962)
(brackets in original)).
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purchase until the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code.33 The draft-
ers attempted to revive the Roman law objective test34 for determining
whether a contracting party had performed in good faith. Their attempt
blatantly failed regarding section 1-208.
Section 1-208 governs the lender's performance in accelerating a debt
based on insecurity. The standard of good faith cross-referenced in section
1-208, however, has been interpreted by the courts as being purely subjec-
tive. Courts create an anomalous exception to the notion that good faith
performance is to be measured by an objective standard when they allow
acceleration due to insecurity to be measured by a subjective standard. The
courts' confusion can be traced to the draftsmen's failure to consider the
consequences of neglecting to distinguish transactions involving perform-
ance and purchase when they defined "good faith" under section 1-201(19).
C. Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code
The initial draft of the Code provided only a general definition of good
faith in Article 1, which was to be used for all purposes throughout the
Code.35 The draft provided that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, in this Act:
... 'good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and obser-
vance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business
33. See, eg., Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967). In
Williams, the court applied section 75 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (MD. ANN. CODE, § 75
(1957)), in effect at the time of the execution of the mortgage. The Williams court concluded that:
A purchaser lacks the good faith requisite for attaining holder in due course status only if
he has actual knowledge of fraud or other defect.., or if he consciously ignores facts
which would lead him to discover the defect. The test is said to be subjective, for a pur-
chaser may be a holder in due course, if he purchases with a "white heart" but an "empty
head."
Id. at 584-85, 229 A.2d at 716.
The uniform acts which precede the Code refer to good faith over fifty times and not once is
good faith used in terms of good faith performance. "A subjective test of'honesty in fact' is used
consistently throughout the uniform acts." Id. at 671; see also supra note 24.
The Uniform Commercial Code has placed significance on both good faith purchase and good
faith performance. In the Code, good faith purchase refers mostly to the articles dealing with
negotiable instruments and sales. (This is consistent with the development of a good faith
purchase standard); see, eg., supra note 23. On the other hand, good faith performance has a
direct impact on all agreements governed by the Code. Comment, supra note 6, at 923; see also
Sections cited supra note 20.
34. But cf Comment, supra note 33, at 923 (The drafters have revived the notion of good
faith performance and developed an objective standard for determining whether a party has per-
formed in good faith. "Thus, far from being neglected in modern law, the doctrine of good faith
performance has eclipsed the doctrine of good faith purchase in importance and general
application.").
35. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 673.
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or trade in which he is engaged."36 Thus, the section added an objective
standard37 to good faith purchase and good faith performance. 3 In Sep-
tember 1950, the American Bar Association's Committee on the Proposed
Commercial Code of the Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law objected to the inclusion of the objective component.39 In a spirit of
compromise," the drafters limited the general definition of good faith to its
current "honesty in fact" standard,41 and inserted objective standards in
several specific provisions.42 The draftsmen apparently believed that what
36. See Lawrence & Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend
Additional Financing, 63 IND. L.J. 825, 843 n.86 (1988) (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(16) (May 1949
Draft)).
37. An objective standard can be defined as an observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards from the perspective of a reasonable man.
38. The drafters did not restrict good faith as defined in accordance with "reasonable com-
mercial standards" to dealings between businesspeople, but provided only a single, unitary defini-
tion. Summers, supra note 30, at 207.
39. The American Bar Association's committee gave three reasons for its recommendation:
(1) belief that the average person and the average lawyer understand good faith to mean
primarily "honesty;"
(2) "observance of reasonable commercial standards" carries (with it) implications of us-
ages, customs or practices which are ambiguous; and
(3) reasonable commercial standards could freeze customs and destroy flexibility essential
for growth of commercial practices.
Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. L. 113, 128 (1951); see also Braucher, The
Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. RPv. 798, 812 (1958). Con-
sider, as well, that the "subjective-objective" controversy raged for decades in the context of good
faith purchase. See generally infra, note 106. Proponents of the subjective standard were not
going to allow one hundred years of precedent (good faith purchase - subjective standard) to be
changed by a general overriding definition in the Code.
But Professor Gilmore suggests a less "altruistic" motivation existed for limiting the obliga-
tion of good faith. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMEIcAN LAW 83-86 (1977) (practicing attor-
neys who participated in the drafting of the Code became more influential as the document
reached its final stage).
40. It has been noted that the drafters were significantly influenced by formulations of good
faith in the purchase context. Summers, supra note 38, at 208. Professor Summers stated:
In the early drafts, Karl N. Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the code, had the purchase
context very much at the forefront of his mind in drafting good faith definitions. See, eg.,
U.C.C. § 10, comment (1948 Draft). No doubt many other scholars of commercial law
were, at this time, thinking in the same vein. For example, one author stated: "In its
customary setting in problems of bona fide purchase, a concept such as 'good faith' is
necessary, and reasonably workable." Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA L.
REv. 457, 475 (1949).
Id. at 208 n.53.
41. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1988).
42. Eg., U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1988) (defines "good faith" for merchants as including the
observance of reasonable commercial standards); U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(b) (1988) (requires that a
holder must take instrument in good faith); U.C.C. § 3-406 (1988) (protects the drawee bank that
makes payment to customer in accordance with reasonable standards); U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (1988)
(affords protection to person who deals in accordance with reasonable commercial standards with
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would suffice in the purchase context would also suffice in other contexts
(i.e., "good faith is good faith").43 As Professor Farnsworth' states: "The
demise of the single, unitary definition of good faith... was one of the
major casualties during the drafting of the Code."'45
The development of good faith performance and the history of the
"good faith" definition in subsection 1-201(19) demonstrate the sacrifice
made by the drafters in their selection of "honesty in fact." Section 1-208
by its nature concerns good faith performance - a creditor's acceleration
of debt when he deems himself insecure. "Good faith performance properly
requires some objective standard tied to commercial reasonableness."'
This principle existed under Roman law47 and under pre-Code case law in
this country," and it remains intact under most provisions of the Code.49
Professor Grant Gilmore, a drafter of the Code, stated that: "[T]he credi-
tor has the right to accelerate if, under all circumstances, a reasonable man,
motivated by good faith, would have done so."'' Professor Farnsworth
added:
Good faith performance has always required the cooperation of one
party where it was necessary in order that the other might secure the
expected benefits of the contract. And the standard for determining
what cooperation was required has always been an objective stan-
dard, based on the decency, fairness or reasonableness of the com-
munity and not on the individual's own beliefs as to what might be
decent, fair or reasonable. Both common sense and tradition dictate
an objective standard for good faith performance.5"
other than true owner of a commercial instrument); U.C.C. § 7-404 (1988) (discharges a bailee of
liability if he disposes of goods observing reasonable commercial standards); U.C.C. § 7-501(4)
(1988) (provides that a document of title is negotiated when purchased in good faith unless not
part of regular course of business); U.C.C. § 8-318 (1988) (discharges a bailee who observes rea-
sonable commercial standards when dealing in certified securities according to principal's
instructions).
43. Summers, supra note 30, at 208.
44. E. Allen Farnsworth is a professor of law at Columbia Law University. He is often cited
for the distinction made between good faith performance and purchase. His publications include:
CONTRACT LAW IN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES; HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT
(1987); AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1963); and a law
review article; see FARNSWORTH, supra note 14.
45. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 673.
46. Id. at 671.
47. See generally supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
48. See generally infra note 115 and accompanying text.
49. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 672. See also list of U.C.C. sections with specific objective
good faith provisions, supra note 42.
50. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.4, at 1197 (1965)
(quoted in Sheppard Federal Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969)).
51. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 672.
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Yet the courts are led to apply a subjective test because no specific objective
element is supplied in the text.-2 Section 1-103 answers the courts' con-
cerns. The drafters' sacrifice of the good faith performance and good faith
purchase dichotomy has left the courts fumbling over which standard to
apply in analyzing section 1-208 cases.
IlL. COURTS' CONFUSION
Most courts rely on subsection 1-201(19) to define good faith. 3
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction con-
cerned."5 4 The courts have interpreted this phrase to be subjective in na-
ture5 - a "white heart-empty head" test.56 An "honesty in fact" standard
52. Note that although the U.C.C. sections listed, supra note 42, contain an objective element
in the text, they still refer the reader to § 1-201 to define good faith.
53. The Uniform Commercial Code is composed of nine substantive articles. The first pro-
vides general definitions and principles applicable throughout the Code. Section 1-208 is con-
tained in Article 1. Each official comment within a Code section cross-references to relevant
definitions of cognate Code sections. Section 1-208 refers the reader to § 1-201 for the definition
of "good faith." It is at this stage that the confusion begins.
Decisions construing § 1-201(19) of the Code to be that of a subjective good faith standard as
applied to various parts of the Commercial Code include: Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank &
Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970); Third Nat'l Bank v. Hardi-Gardens Supply of Ill. Inc., 380
F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Tenn. 1974); Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 362 Mass. 797, 291 N.E.2d 603
(1973); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296
Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973); Balon v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 113 N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194
(1973); General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971); McConnico v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d
198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Richardson Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974); Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Von Gohren v. Pacific
Nat'l Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467 (1973); see also Comment, supra note 24, at 153.
For specific application to § 1-208, see Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303,
1310 (10th Cir. 1971); Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 175, 177 243 S.E.2d 528,
530 (1978); Van Bibber v. Norris, 275 Ind. 555, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1981); Farmers Coop.
Elevator, Inc., Duncombe v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Iowa 1975); Van Horn v. Van
de Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 960-61, 497 P.2d 252, 253 (1972); see also cases cited supra note 3
and accompanying text.
54. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1988).
55. One of the strongest statements of this subjective approach appears in Werner v. Berg-
man, 28 Kan. 60 (1882). The Werner court held:
The only question at all material in such a case is whether the mortgagee [creditor] does in
fact so feel (insecure); and if the mortgagee claims that he has such a feeling, and afterward
on the trial testifies that at the time he took possession of property he had such a feeling,
and if upon the facts of the case it is possible at all to believe that any person, however
timid and fearful he might be, might have had such a feeling, then it should be held that
the mortgagee had a right to take possession of the property.
Ia at 65; accord, American State Bank v. Holding, 189 Kan. 641, 371 P.2d (1962); City Loan &
Sav. Co. v. Sheban, 65 Ohio App. 7, 29 N.W.2d 171 (1939) (note that Werner is a pre-Code case
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requires the trier of fact57 to focus on the creditor's state of mind. The
creditor need only have an honest belief that payment of the obligation is
impaired. Under this standard there is no requirement that the belief be
reasonable. Therefore, creditors are afforded an opportunity to abuse the
drafters' initial intent-to protect the debtor.59
A recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court demonstrates the ineq-
uities of applying a subjective standard to section 1-208 acceleration
clauses. In Karner v. Willis,' ° a bank officer, knowing that the debtor was
not delinquent on any payments and without any knowledge that the debtor
was insolvent, exercised the bank's common law right to set-off.61 The of-
ficer claimed that he deemed the bank was impaired in its security based on
and thus the discussion of the scope of § 1-208, supra notes 47-63, is inapplicable); see also Farm-
ers, 237 N.W.2d at 678; Eldon's, 296 Minn. at 133, 207 N.W.2d at 287.
56. Despite the apparent approval of the subjective "white heart-empty head" test (see supra
note 53 and accompanying text), there exists authority criticizing its use. See W. HAWKLAND,
BILLs AND NoTEs 194-97 (1956); Recent Case, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1200 (1940).
The "white heart-empty head" test has also been called the "blundering fool doctrine." See,
e.g., Schnitz v. American Trust & Say. Bank, 152 Ill. App. 76, 78 (1909) ("A blundering fool may
therefore be found to have acted in good faith, though under like circumstances a shrewd business
man might be deemed to have acted in bad faith.").
57. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 13 Conn. App. 712, 539 A.2d 595,
(1988); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Curfman, 386 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Ginn,
145 Ga. App. 195, 243 S.E.2d 528; Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 198
(N.M. CL App. 1978); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325 (Ct.
App. 1978), cert denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978).
58. McKay, 92 N.M. at 185, 585 P.2d at 329 (Sutin, J., concurring).
59. See Note, supra note 5, at 630 (citing Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commer-
cial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 672 (1963)
and Official Comment U.C.C. § 1-208: "according to the Official Comment, the section was in-
cluded in the U.C.C. to alleviate the confusion about 'the effect to be given to a clause which
seemingly grants the power of an acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party.'" Id. at 650
n.32.); see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620
(1975):
It is clear that the drafters of the U.C.C. intended to promote commercial dealing and
credit financing by permitting creditors to realize upon their security in doubtful situations
without the necessity of a specific default.
It is however, equally clear that a purely subjective test is subject to arbitrary abuse. It
would allow a creditor to be unreasonable and place the debtor in an unjust position since
the creditor might at any time call the entire debt and require the debtor to prove the
nonexistent state of mind of the creditor. Thus, under this interpretation, the Code would
permit a creditor to destroy a viable contractual relationship without requiring him to
justify his actions.
Id. at 524, 329 N.E.2d at 625-26.
60. 10 Kan. App. 2d 432, 700 P.2d 582, aff'd, 238 Kan. 246, 710 P.2d 21 (1985).
61. Set-off is described as a remedy "employed by [a creditor] ... to discharge or reduce [a
debtor's] ... demand by an opposite one arising from [a] transaction which is extrinsic to [the
debtor's] . . . cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979). A creditor
reduces the amount he owes the debtor via bank accounts by the amount owed to him by the
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his knowledge of the registration of a foreign judgment against the debtor.
Yet only thirteen days after the set-off of $39,178.20, the bank loaned the
debtor an additional $50,000 (partially secured by the collateral pledged for
the original loan).62
The court of appeals recognized that there certainly was evidence
presented that, viewed objectively, the bank was not insecure, but
that the test of good faith dictated by ... 1-208 is subjective and
requires only honesty in fact .... The court of appeals then applied
the subjective test required by the statute and concluded that the
trial court's finding of good faith was supported by substantial com-
petent evidence.63
A majority of the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the lower court
correctly decided this issue.64 Thus, even though the bank thought itself
insecure, with the Kansas Supreme Court supporting this contention, the
bank was willing to loan the same debtor an amount 125% greater than the
amount upon which it based its initial insecurity.6"
The confusion created by the drafter's use of subsection 1-201(19) in
defining good faith in section 1-208 can be demonstrated in conflicting deci-
sions among jurisdictions, confusion within state jurisdictional boundaries,
and confusion even within one courtroom.
A. Conflicting Decisions Among Jurisdictions
To illustrate the inequity of the nonuniform application of section 1-
208, compare the outcomes in Van Horn v. Van de Wol, Inc.,66 and Rich-
ards Engineers, Inc v. Spanel.6I
In Van Horn, the creditor deemed himself insecure on a loan taken to
operate a golf course. The creditor based his action on an erroneous belief
that the debtor had been denied additional financing, when in fact the
debtor had not been denied a loan. The Washington Court of Appeals,
debtor. But see Spencer Say. Loan Ass'n v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 Bankr. 194 (D.
Mass. 1987) (sets up three requirements that a bank must meet prior to exercising its set-off right).
62. Karner, 238 Kan. at 249, 710 P.2d 21, 23 (Herd, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The 125% figure can be explained by the following formula:
Additional amount loaned to debtor
Amount that debtor owed when
$527209 bank deemed itself insecure$9,178.0 = .762199 --- 1.25
$39,178.20 1.25 X 100% = 125%
66. 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972).
67. 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
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using a subjective standard, held that the creditor's acceleration was in
good faith, and was therefore valid.6"
Similarly, in Richards, the debtors obtained a loan to operate their busi-
ness. The creditor deemed himself insecure when the debtors were unsuc-
cessful in obtaining additional financing. However, the Colorado Court of
Appeals suggested that a subjective test of insecurity would be wholly
unjust:
It would be highly inequitable to require less than reasonable
grounds in order to accelerate an entire debt based on insecurity,
especially in light of the more onerous burden placed on the debtor
by acceleration. The facts of the present case make clear the ineq-
uity of a purely subjective standard.69
The result is that different treatment is afforded the debtor depending
upon the state in which he is doing business. Indeed, it must be noted that
the creditor in Washington was found to have acted in good faith based on
a mistake of fact, while, based upon similar facts in Colorado, the creditor
was found to have acted in bad faith.
B. Confusion Within State Jurisdictional Boundaries
In Universal C.L T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler,7° a debtor brought a tor-
tious repossession action against his creditor. The parties had entered into
a retail installment contract containing an insecurity clause. 71 Upon deem-
ing himself insecure, the creditor repossessed the collateral that the debtor
had pledged. The creditor claimed the collateral was not insured and the
debtor was behind on his payments. The court held that the good faith
provision governing the creditor's actions in section 1-208, in conjunction
with the good faith definition provided in subsection 1-201(19),12 must be
modified in order to have any real effect.73 In addition to "coming to that
fixation of the mind that their security was in jeopardy,"'74 a creditor's de-
termination must be one which would be made by a "reasonable man"
under the same set of facts or circumstances.75
68. Van Horn, 6 Wash. App. at 961, 497 P.2d at 254.
69. Richards, 745 P.2d at 1033.
70. 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620 (1975).
71. An insecurity acceleration clause is a "[p]rovision in [a] contract that allows a creditor to
make an entire debt come due if there is good reason to believe that the debtor cannot or will not
pay." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (5th ed. 1979).
72. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between § 1-
208 and § 1-201(19)).
73. Universal, 164 Ind. App. at 520, 329 N.E.2d at 623.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 521, 329 N.E.2d at 626.
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A little over a year later, the same Indiana Court of Appeals held a
creditor to a subjective, honest belief standard. 7 6 In 1981, the Indiana
Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of this subjective standard in another
insecurity acceleration case.77 Similarly to the facts in Universal, the parties
in this case had entered into a retail installment sale agreeement containing
an insecurity acceleration clause. The creditor deemed himself insecure and
repossessed the debtor's collateral. The creditor argued that delinquent
payments, the imposition of a lien on the collateral, and nonperformance by
the debtor formed the basis for his insecurity. The court concluded that a
secured party need not observe reasonable commercial standards, but must
act with honesty in fact in the transaction.7 The confusion, unfortunately,
does not end at this point.
The Indiana appellate court, in a 1983 decision, reinstated the use of the
two-step determination of good faith.79 "A good faith belief under... 1-
208... means at least 'honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cered.'... In addition, the determination of insecurity must have been
objectively reasonable .... "80
Thus, in one state, within a period of less than ten years, the courts have
been confused at best. However, Indiana is not alone in its lack of a coher-
ent definition of good faith."1
C. Confusion Within the Courtroom
The definitional confusion has emerged even within single court opin-
ions. In Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine.,82 the appellate court ex-
amined the trial court judge's jury instructions outlining the standard of
good faith and found that:
[T]he judge initially formulated two standards. First, he stated that
the contract, as a whole, was subject to a "convenant of good faith
and fair dealing." Second, with specific reference to the claim that
Depositors inappropriately disposed of Reid's collateral, he stated
that the bank had a duty to act in a "commercially reasonable man-
ner." In seeing the latter standard, he cited Article 9 of the
UCC.... He then twice defined "good faith" in terms indicating a
purely subjective standard. He concluded the instruction, however,
76. Holmes v. Rushville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 170 Ind. App. 509, 553 N.E.2d 509, withdrawn,
170 Ind. App. 309, 355 N.E.2d 417, reinstated, 170 Ind. App. 509, 357 N.E.2d 734 (1976).
77. Van Bibber v. Norris, 275 Ind. 555, 419 N.E.2d 115 (1981).
78. Id. at 566, 419 N.E.2d at 122.
79. Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
80. Id. at 1064.
81. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
82. 821 F.2d 9 (lst. Cir. 1987).
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by reformulating the "good faith" test as including an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness.
The jury later requested that the judge clarify these instructions. In
his new instructions, the judge clearly formulated a subjective stan-
dard for good faith.83
Although a clear standard was enunciated at the conclusion of the trial, the
jury had already been confronted with statements defining the law of the
case as being both subjective and objective.
These cases demonstrate a clear need for a uniform standard for the
good faith acceleration contained in section 1-208. The purpose for adopt-
ing a uniform code is uniformity, and this, in and of itself, warrants a uni-
form standard.
IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
A. The Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code 4 has been adopted in full by all states
except Louisiana. 5 The Code can trace its genesis to preceeding acts insti-
tuted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(National Conference of Commissioners). 6 By the late 1930s, these acts
had clearly failed to fulfill their purpose of keeping up with modem com-
83. Id. at 14.
84. The Uniform Commercial Code is "[o]ne of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws governing commercial transactions (sales of
goods, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, ware-
house receipts, bills of lading, investment securities and secured transactions)." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1373 (5th ed. 1979).
85. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Official Text of 1962 has been substantially adopted
in all states with slight variations from state to state. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, p. 1 (1972). Louisiana has adopted
only articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, the pre-1977 version of article 8, and the 1972 revision of Article 9.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1989). The Louisiana Legislature adopted
Article 9 in 1988 (1988 L. Acts 528). It became effective July 1, 1989. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:9-101 (West Supp. 1989).
Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Commercial Code Official Text of 1958. Through the work of
Justice John H. Wickhem and the Wisconsin Legislative Council, the Commercial Code was
adopted in 1961 and became effective on July 1, 1965. Justice Wickhem was a member of the
American Law Institute ("ALI") and advisor for Article 3 of the Code. For a discussion of the
ALI, see infra note 91. COMMERCIAL CODE COMM., REPORT TO THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL OF 1963 (1963) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL CODE COMM.].
86. In 1892, the American Bar Association created the National Conference of Commission-
ers on the Uniform State Laws to promote uniformity in state law on all subjects where deemed
desirable and practicable. This Conference sponsored a number of "uniform acts" in the field of
commercial law including the following:
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mercial practices in a uniform manner.8 7 At the fiftieth annual meeting of
Act Promulgated in
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 1896
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 1906
Uniform Sales Act 1906
Uniform Bill of Lading Act 1909
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 1909
Uniform Conditional Sales Act 1918
Uniform Trust Receipts Act 1933
The Parliament's action in 1882, the English Bills of Exchange Acts in 1893, and the adoption
of the English Sale of Goods Act inspired the Commissioner's enactment of the Uniform Negotia-
ble Instruments Law and the Uniform Sales Act.
All states adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act. Almost two-thirds of the states adopted the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. The remaining acts received a lighter embrace. See generally STONE, supra
note 85, at 1-2; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 85, at 2-3; GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF MISSOURI COMM. ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
ITS EFFECT UPON COGNATE MISSOURI STATUTES, Report No. 15, at 7 (Dec. 1954) [hereinafter
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MISSOURI]; Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 226 (1963).
For acts less accepted, see R. BRAUCHER & A. SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS,
SELECTED STATUTES x-xi (1964 ed.) (Table of Statutes Adopted). But see Comment, Uniform
Commercial Code Commentary, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM L. REv. 568, 569-70 n.8 (1967) (authored
by William Hicks) (suggests that all acts received widespread adoption).
For more information concerning the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, see Dun-
ham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1965); Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1967). For work undertaken by the Com-
missioners in recent years, see the reports in the UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. published by the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law:
Pascal, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 435 (1947-52);
Pierce, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 247 (1953-55);
Barrett, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 199 (1956);
Dezendorf, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 237 (1957);
Dezendorf, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 141 (1958);
Richter, UNIFICATION OF L. Y.B. 377 (1959-60).
87. The purpose of the conference is best stated in the National Conference of Commis-
sioner's Constitution:
Its object shall be (1) to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity
is deemed desirable and practicable; (2) to draft model acts on (a) subjects suitable for
interstate compacts, and (b) subjects in which uniformity will make more effective the
exercise of state powers and promote interstate cooperation; and (3) to promote uniformity
of judicial decisions throughout the United States.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW, Report No. 49, at xxi (1957); GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY OF MISSOURI, supra note 86, at 7.
Malcolm explained that:
The basic reason for the code was the recognition that, during the period since 1900, there
has been tremendous growth in the commercial activity of the country; that in many areas
new patterns of commerce have sprung up and in others material changes have occurred;
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:639
the National Conference of Commissioners, held in 1940, the Commission-
ers88 adopted a proposal89 to prepare a uniform commercial code.90 In con-
junction with the American Law Institute,91 the National Conference of
Commissioners released its first official text of the Uniform Commercial
Code in September of 1951. It was known as the 1952 Official Text and
Comments Edition. 92 Since then the official text of the Uniform Commer-
that the 1900 versions of our commercial acts do not adequately handle these new patterns
of activity and these changes, with the result that there is a very real need for an "updat-
ing" of the commercial law.
Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code, 39 OR. L. REv. 318, 318 (1960).
To illustrate the need to update the Acts forming the basis for commercial law, see the specific
examples laid out in id. at 318-39; and Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in
Massachusetts, 13 Bus. LAW. 490, 490-91 (1958).
88. For a discussion of the composition of members at the 1940 Conference, see generally
Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36
A.B.A. J. 419 (1950); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 23-72 (West 10th ed. 1988).
At the present time the Conference is composed of from one to five commissioners from each
of the fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The commissioners are appointed by
the chief executive acting under express legislative authority, or by general executive authority.
The commissioners are selected from the legal profession - lawyers, judges of standing, or profes-
sors of law. They serve without compensation for an appointment period of about three years.
An annual meeting is held for five or six days immediately preceding the meeting of the American
Bar Association. Malcolm, supra note 86, at 227-28.
89. The proposal was made at the 1940 conference by William A. Schnader, the President of
the National Conference of Commissioners at that time. To gain a better perspective concerning
Schnader's contribution to the development of the Uniform Commercial Code, see Schnader,
supra note 86. Schnader states:
Could not a great uniform commercial code be prepared, which would bring the commer-
cial law up to date, and which could become the uniform law of our fifty-three jurisdic-
tions, [at that time the 48 states plus the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico] by the passage of only fifty-three acts instead of many times
that number?
Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should be "Uniform," 20 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 237, 240
(1963), reprinted in 69 CoM. L. J. 117, 118 (1964).
90. Malcolm, supra note 86, at 229. Since each of the uniform acts preceding 1940 had be-
come a part of the statutory law relating to commercial transactions, there was a need to integrate
each of these acts with the others. B. STONE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL 2
(1975). The proposal updated and coordinated the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
with new provisions for a fresh approach to commercial law. Malcolm, supra note 86, at 229.
91. The American Law Institute is defined as a "[g]roup of American legal scholars who are
responsible for the Restatements in the various disciplines of the law and who.., prepare some of
the Uniform State Laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979). The American Law
Institute is a voluntary organization comprised of approximately 1500 judges, law professors and
leading members of the American Bar Association. It was organized in 1923 to improve the law.
Malcolm, supra note 86, at 228.
92. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 85, § 1 at 4; Malcolm, supra note 86, at 230.
1990] UCC GOOD FAITH
cial Code has been revised several times.93 Despite the many variations of
the Code,9" the Code sections adopted by most states are almost identical.95
93. There were several opponents to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Profes-
sor Beutel of the University of Nebraska criticized the Code on numerous occasions. See, ag.,
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform P1 Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.L 334,
362-63 (1952); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 141 (1951); Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code
Article 3 and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. 531 (1951).
In 1952, Emmett F. Smith began a one-man campaign to upset the Code. He circulated two
forty-page memorandums nationwide criticizing the Code. Braucher, supra note 86, at 802.
During the years of debate over the states' adoption of the Code, various committees and
subcommittees were created to evaluate the effectiveness of the Code. For instance, a New York
subcommittee reviewed the Code's provisions from 1953 to 1956 and concluded that:
(1) The "preponderance" of the arguments for or against codification "is in favor of care-
ful and foresighted codification of all or major parts of commercial law."
(2) Such a commercial code "would be of greater value to the public and the legal profes-
sion than the enactment, even with revisions, of separate uniform laws."
(3) Such a code "is attainable with a reasonable amount of effort and within a reasonable
amount of time."
(4) The Uniform Commercial Code "is not satisfactory in its present form."
(5) The Uniform Commercial Code "cannot be made satisfactory without comprehensive
re-examination and revision in the light of all critical comment obtainable."
Braucher, supra note 86, at 803-04 (citing the 1956 N.Y. REPoRT 65(A), at 57-58 (1956)). This
particular subcommittee's examination and recommendations led to the revised Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been revised and republished as official texts in 1957,
1958, 1962, and 1972. In fact, the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. was formed in 1961
to promote uniformity of enactment and construction of the Uniform Commercial Code, and to
evalutate and prepare proposals for amendments of the 1962 official text. As a result, the 1972
official text is almost the same as the 1962 official text, aside from the Article 9 covering secured
transactions. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 85, § 1 at 4-5. For a more thorough
analysis of the Permanent Editorial Board, see Hart, UCC Brief No. 2: Interpreting the Uniform
Commercdial Code, 12 PRAc. LAW. 39, 43-44 (Nov. 1966).
94. See Schnader, supra note 89, at 119-20 (discussion concerning the various revisions made
to the official text or the Code prior to its adopotion in numerous states).
95. Comment, supra note 89, at 578. For a general discussion of the various state variations,
see id. at 574-78. For instance, § 1-208, the major focus of this Comment, has been adopted by all
fifty states. Only Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have varied the 1962 official text's lan-
guage of the section.
Virginia has added "[i]n any transaction arising out of the sale or financing of consumer goods
as defined in [§ ]8.9-109 of this Code, the burden of proof establishing good faith shall be on the
party seeking to exercise the power." VA. CODE § 8.1-208 (1950). Washington omits the last
sentence of § 1-208. See WASH. REv. CODE § 62A. 1-208 (1950). Wisconsin replaces "shall have
the power" with "may." This amendment arguably has no effect on the meaning of § 1-208. See
Wis. STAT. Am. § 401.208 (1965).
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B. Purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code
It is essential to give strong considerations to the underlying purposes
and policies of the Code when analyzing a problem within its scope. 96 The
Code expresses one of its primary purposes and policies97 as follows: "[T]o
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." 98 Several argu-
ments can be posited supporting the Code's necessity for uniformity: 1) the
inherent nature of commercial activity; 2) the need for predictability; and
3) the use of the optimum commercial rule.
First, commercial transactions are no longer restricted to jurisdictional
boundaries, but often extend from state to state.99 As one commentator has
noted:
96. See McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Impli-
cations for Jurisprudence, 126 PA. L. REv. 795, 801 (1978).
97. Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code guides courts in their interpretation of the
adopted code sections. Specifically, § 1-102 addresses the purposes and rules of construction of
the Code. In pertinent part, it provides the following:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1988); see infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
98. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1988).
Many judges, law professors and practicing lawyers contend that the most important underly-
ing purpose and policy of the "Uniform" Commercial Code is uniformity:
One would think that if the hundreds of thousands of hours of time and the hundreds of
thousands of dollars of money which went into the drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code had produced a "model" commercial Code, to serve as the base for any state desiring
to imporve its statutory law governing commercial transactions, the states would have
enacted it immediately. The truth is that the busy judges, law professors and practicing
lawyers who contributed the hundreds of thousands of hours, and the foundations and
business concerns that contributed the hundreds of thousands of dollars, would never have
contributed their time or their money for the preparation of a "model" Commercial Code.
Schnader, supra note 89, at 237, 69 CoM. L.J. at 117 (emphasis added). But cf. Comment,
supra note 86, at 579-80 (the Code was sold as a "model").
99. As of 1963, William Schnader commented that: "Today, in the United States, the
number of important concerns which transact business in every state is growing every year and
the number which transact business in only one state is becoming less and less percentagewise."
Schnader, supra note 89, at 248, 69 COM. L.J. at 121. Schnader continues by citing an article
written by Walter Malcolm in the April 1958 edition of THE BusiNESS LAWYER:
[Tihe number of "items" handled by banks as a part of the bank collection process has,
since 1900, grown to tremendous proportions. It has been estimated that throughout the
entire country, banks handle not less than 25,000,000 items every business day. As a mat-
ter of fact, a rough test, made after that 25,000,000 estimate was made, indicates that the
figure is nearer to 50,000,000 items per day rather than twenty-five.
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* with increased speeds of communication and transportation the
world grows smaller every day. So also do the United States and the
several states in the United States. With business, commerce and
financing becoming increasingly interstate, it is seriously inefficient
to have the degree of variation in rules of commercial law presently
existing between one state and another. Commerce does not flow
nearly as smoothly as it might and a major objective of the Code is
to modernize the rules and make them uniform in the several states
so that commerce, business, and finance can operate more
efficiently." °
"Commercial law... deals with matters of world-wide moment. It sub-
serves universal needs. In consequence, to achieve its end, it must be more
or less universal."101
Second, uniformity of commercial law is needed to create a precise
guide for commercial transactions under which the participants may pre-
dict with confidence the results of their dealings.1 2 Considering the
amount of interstate activity, laws governing transactions must be uniform
from state to state. If one lender is subject to a less stringent standard of
good faith than another when accelerating debt, there is nothing to prevent
the unwary debtor from entering into a bargain believing he will be subject
to reasonable expectations, but instead become subjected to the lender's
whim. The Uniform Commercial Code was created to displace scattered
legislation or decisional law and to formulate, as fully as practicable, a com-
This tremendous volume moving with surprising speed and efficiency from one bank to
another within single cities and towns over state boundary lines has created a set of
problems which are in no way satisfactorily handled by the commercial acts of 1900.
Id.
100. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 13 Bus. LAW.
490, 491 (1958). For further particulars on this theme, see Schnader, supra note 89, at 238-40, 69
COM. L.. at 117-18.
101. Comment, supra note 86, at 569 (quoting Pound, Uniformity of Commercial Law on the
American Continent, 8 MICH. L. REv. 91, 93 (1909)). In fact, Roscoe Pound suggests in his
article that many propose the adoption of a uniform code of commercial law in all countries - an
International Commercial Code. Pound, supra, at 96.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) also
promotes uniformity as an objective of the Uniform Commercial Code. (CISG, Art. 7(1)) 1 R.
ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 42, at 26 (Supp. Nov. 1988). But
see Comment, supra note 86, at 569-70 (weakens the argument that the nature of commercial
activity requires uniformity).
102. In re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972); see also
Butts v. Glendale Plywood Co., 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983); Cleveland Lumber Co. v.
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Community Bank v. Jones,
278 Or. 647, 667, 566 P.2d 470, 482 (1977); Pacific Prod., Inc. v. Great W. Plywood, Ltd., 528
S.W.2d 286, 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 304 (1973).
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prehensive and workable set of guidelines to govern all aspects of commer-
cial dealing.10 3
Last, the drafters of the Code spent many hours of debate considering
the specific language, the structure of that language, and its relation to com-
mercial practices. The result must be the optimum rule for the achievement
of efficient commercial activity." 4 The Code does not take sides between
creditors and debtors, buyers and sellers, or bankers and finance companies.
Rather, it seeks to facilitate all business by incorporating modern practice,
and by making the governing law easier to understand.
However, the uniformity of the Code depends upon uniform interpreta-
tion in the adopting states. 10 5 Without consistent application of the official
text throughout the jurisdictions, the very purpose for which the Code was
enacted will be lost. Many court opinions have reflected this attitude by
considering decisions of other jurisdictions regarding the interpretation of
the Code.10 6 At least one court accepted other jurisdictions' decisions and
103. Pacific Prod., 528 S.W.2d at 291.
104. Commercial Code Comm., supra note 85, at 569; see also Financial Universal Corp. v.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 683 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (encourages the adoption of the
majority rule); Malcolm, supra note 86, at 226 (U.C.C. is one coherent statement of the best laws
and practices in the United States.).
105. Hart, supra note 93, at 40. See generally Comment, supra note 86, at 578-86.
106. To appreciate the amount of variance between jurisdictions relying upon sister states'
decisions, compare the first set of cases cited which strongly support uniformity between state
borders, and the latter set which moderately support uniform interpretation: In re Varney Wood
Prod., Inc., 458 F.2d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1972); Silver v. Gulf City Body & Trailer Works, 432 F.2d
992, 993 (5th Cir. 1970); Needle v. Lasco Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 1109, 89 Cal. Rptr.
593, 595 (1970); Fritz v. Belcher Oil Co., 363 So. 2d 155, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 372 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1979); Magon v. Avdoyan, 299 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct.
1974); Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 74, 558 P.2d 1026, 1045 (1976); Kansas Bankers
Surety Co. v. Ford County State Bank, 184 Kan. 529, 531-32, 338 P.2d 309, 312 (1959); A. J.
Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97 N.J. Super 246, 261, 234 A.2d 737, 744 (1967);
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 226,
229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 396 (1969), rev'd, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S. 2d 585 (1970). Miracle
Feeds, Inc. v Attica Dairy Farm, 129 Wis. 2d 377, 384-85, 385 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Ct. App. 1986)
(Dykman, J., concurring).
For moderate support of uniformity see Stoltzner v. American Motors Jeep Corp., 127 Ill.
App. 3d 816, 819, 469 N.E.2d 443, 445 (1984); Floor v. Melvin, 5 II. App. 3d 463, 466, 283
N.E.2d 303, 306 (1972); M & K Corp. v. Farmers State Bank, 496 N.E.2d 111, 113 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); L & V Co. v. Asch, 267 Md. 251, 258, 297 A.2d 285, 288 (1972); Chemo v. Bank of
Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 288, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120, aff'd, 29 A.D.2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862
(1968).
But see International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32, 34-35
(Fla. 1974), superseded by statute, ITT Indus. Credit Corp. v. Regan, 487 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1986).
The Florida Supreme Court explicitly diverged from decisions held by other courts. The Florida
Legislature registered its disapproval and amended the statute being interpreted in International
Harvester to incorporate other state's decisions. See In re Outrigger Club, Inc., 6 Bankr. 78, 81
(Fla. 1980).
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stated that "[u]nder the last provision [the uniform construction clause] de-
cisions of the highest courts of other states are, speaking generally, prece-
dents by which we are more or less imperatively bound in cases where
similar questions are presented." 1°7
Another court justified uniform interpretation as follows: "A court
should be particularly mindful of the importance of reaching a decision in
harmony with decisions in other states in order to avoid trapping an out-of-
state person who would not suspect any local variation."108 The Code was
designed to employ language that would control courts and compel deci-
sion. "The personal predilections of a particular judge are not properly part
of the interpretive process." 1 9
V. WHICH STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SECTION 1-208
A. The Standard
The rationale behind section 1-208 is to protect the debtor from the
unexpected acceleration of the contract payment due to the uncontrolled
will of the creditor.110 The acceleration provision should be exercised only
as a "shield against security impairment[s]," and not as a "sword [in the
creditor's hand] for economical gain." ' To ensure such protection to
debtors, and to provide a nonrevocable guideline for creditors an objective
standard should be adopted by courts on their own initiative or in response
to legislative reform.
B. Support for the Use of an Objective Standard of Good Faith
The use of an objective standard of good faith by the courts can be sup-
ported by the construction of various Code sections within the Uniform
Commercial Code-Sections 1-103, 2-609 and 1-203.
1. Section 1-103
Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-103 states that "[u]nless displaced
by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity...
107. Town of Manchester v. Town of Townshend, 109 Vt. 65, 69, 192 A. 22, 23 (1937).
108. In re Carmichael Enter., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 94, 105 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d
1405 (5th Cir. 1972).
109. International Harvester, 296 So. 2d at 36.
110. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1269 n.15 (10th Cir.
1988) (citing Brown v. AVEMCO Inc., 603 F.2d 1367, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1979)).
111. AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1379.
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shall supplement its provisions." '112 An acceleration clause, by its very
existence, is guided by equitable considerations.' 1 3 The drafters of the Code
designed section 1-208 in furtherance of these equitable principles.' 1 4
Although the official comment to section 1-208 cross-references subsection
1-201(19) to define good faith, the official comment to subsection 1-201(19)
states that "good faith," as it is defined in that section, provides only a
minimum standard." 5 Hence, the drafters left room for an objective
application.
To demonstrate the inequities of the use of the subjective standard of
good faith, a discussion of pre-Code cases and the creditor-debtor relation-
ship will follow.
a. Pre-Code Case Analysis
An analysis of cases decided before the adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code reveals that many courts applied an objective standard to de-
termine whether the creditor had accelerated in good faith.1 6 An extreme
112. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1988). Section 1-103 has general application throughout the Code as it
is part of article 1. The provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are logically divided into
interlocking articles each of which handles one major subdivision of commercial law. Article 1
does not cover any traditional field of commercial law. Rather, Article I sets forth principles and
definitions of general application relating to uniform construction. See Summers, "Good Faith"
in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REv. 195 (1968).
But see Dworkin, The Case for Law-A Critique, I VAL. U.L. Rav. 214, 215-17 (1967)
(countervailing tendency in our law to view principles as less law than specific rules). This factor
has presumably impeded recognition of general obligations of good faith in our law. Lawrence &
Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63
IND. L. J. 825 (1988).
113. See State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d
1145 (Utah 1976).
114. "Acceleration is a matter of equity and the courts... have historically been careful to
evaluate the fairness of acceleration in the particular facts of a case." AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1376.
For a discussion of equitable principles applicable to acceleration clauses before the adoption
of the Code see Annotation, Grounds of Relief from Acceleration Clause in Mortgage, 70 A.L.R.
993 (1931); Annotation, Acceptance of Past-Due Interest as Waiver of Acceleration Clause in Note
or Mortgage, 97 A.L.R.2d 997 (1964).
115. "'Good faith,' whenever it is used in the Code, means at least what is here stated."
Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1988).
116. As of 1920, the interpretation of insecurity clauses had taken three paths: (1) That there
must be reasonable cause to accelerate; e.g., Skookum Lumber Co. v. Sacajawea Lumber & Shin-
gle Co., 107 Wash. 356, 181 P. 914 (1919); Newlean v. Olson, 22 Neb. 717, 36 N.W. 155 (1888);
(2) That there must be apparent cause and good faith on the part of the vendor; e.g., Sills v.
Hawes, 14 Colo. App. 157, 59 P. 422 (1899); Oppenheimer v. Moore, 107 A.D. 301, 95 N.Y.S.
138 (1905); Truman v. Threshing Mach. Co., 169 Mich. 153, 135 N.W. 89 (1912); (3) That the
vendor deemed himself insecure; e.g., Thorp v. Fleming, 78 Kan. 237, 96 P. 470 (1908); Koster v.
Seney, 100 Iowa 558, 69 N.W. 868 (1897). It was thought that the second view most nearly
1990] UCC GOOD FAITH
example of the inequities which followed from the adoption of a subjective
standard was demonstrated in the state of Washington. In Hines v. Pacific
Car Co., I 7 the defendant sold a truck to the plaintiff on an installment plan.
The agreement contained a clause allowing the defendant to retake prop-
erty, and retain paid-up installments, at any time it deemed itself inse-
cure.11 Before the adoption of the Code, the Washington court held
creditors to an objective standard. The Hines Court held that the defendant
repossessed the truck without reasonable cause to deem itself insecure. 119
After the Code was adopted, the Washington Court of Appeals held that
"[e]ven if [a creditor] was negligent in... [deeming himself insecure], negli-
gence is irrelevant to good faith. The standard is what [the creditor] actu-
ally knew, or believed he knew, not what he could or should have
known." 120
approximated what was most fair to both parties. The third view appeared to be unnecessarily
harsh on the vendee. Recent Decision, 21 COLUM. L. RaV. 10 (1921).
An objective, reasonable man approach was taken by these decisions. Moore v. Wimmer, 77
Cal. App. 2d 199, 174 P.2d 640 (1946); Ramstetter v. MacGinnis, 100 Colo. 494, 68 P.2d 454
(1937); Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429, 30 P.2d 863 (1934); Burris v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
15 II1. App. 2d 458, 146 N.E.2d 218 (1957); Rector-Wilhelmy Co. v. Nissen, 35 Neb. 716, 53
N.W. 670 (1892); Parks v. Phillips, 71 Nev. 313, 289 P.2d 1053 (1955); Cook v. C.I.T. Corp., 191
S.C. 440,4 S.E.2d 801 (1939); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Elliott, 414 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1967); see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Johnson, 41 Ala. App. 148, 127 So. 2d 642
(1960); Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463 (Fla. App. 1959); Watson v. Cud-
ney, 144 Ill. App. 624 (1908); Hendrickson v. Grengs, 237 Minn. 196, 54 N.W.2d 105 (1952):
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., v. Turner, 56 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1952); Commercial Credit Co. v.
Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 1 So. 2d 776 (1941); Darling v. Hunt, 46 A.D. 631, 61 N.Y.S. 278 (1899).
But see Huebner v. Koebke, 42 Wis. 319, 321 (1877) ("We can have no doubt that the [insecu-
rity acceleration] clause operates to vest an absolute discretion in the mortgagee."); Frisbee v.
Langworthy, 11 Wis. 393, 396-97 (1860) (Chief Justice Dixon stated "by the express terms of the
mortgage, the plaintiff was authorized to take possession of and sell the property at any time he
saw fit, or what is the same thing, at any time he deemed his debt insecure."); see also Gage v.
Wayland, 67 Wis. 566, 31 N.W. 708 (1887); Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123, 49 N.W. 832 (1879);
Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 270 (1860); Cotton v. Watkins, 6 Wis. 603 (1858); Cotton v. Marsh, 3
Wis. 199 (1854).
Wisconsin affirmed its pre-Code subjective good faith approach recently. See Ford Motor Co.
v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987) (In one of the longest and most
complex jury trials in Wisconsin's legal history, the court concluded that the trial court's subjec-
tive interpretation of § 208 was the only logical answer).
For pre-Code analysis of states' treatment of insecurity acceleration of chattel mortgage, see
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Insecurity Clause in Chattel and Mortgage,
125 A.L.R. 313 (1940).
117. 110 Wash. 75, 188 P. 29 (1920).
118. Id. at 75, 188 P. at 29.
119. Id.
120. Van Horn v. Van de Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 961, 497 P.2d 252, 254 (1972).
A reasonable person standard is typically couched in terms such as "what one could or should
have known." Id.
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The Illinois Appellate Court, in Burris v. Commercial Credit Corp.,121
also applied a subjective standard. In Burris, a pre-Code case, the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant to recover damages suffered for the
alleged wrongful repossession and resale of an automobile. The appellate
court upheld the county court's decision that the holder of the contract did
not have reasonable grounds to feel insecure merely because the automobile
in question had been used by the plaintiff's brother, without permission, in
alleged criminal activity. In this case, it was undisputed that the plaintiff
had not defaulted.122 Yet, after the Code had been adopted in Illinois, the
same court in a recent case, Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. McJunkins,123
stated that "[a]though Illinois has not decided the question, the majority of
courts from other jurisdictions have held that good faith under section 1-
208 is tested by subjective standards in accordance with the Code's general
definition of good faith as honesty in fact." 124 It was not until November
1988, in Watseka First National Bank v. Ruda,125 that the Illinois courts
committed to their pre-Code objective standard. "Illinois courts have not
previously determined whether the test of good faith under ... section [1-
208] is a subjective.., or an objective standard... , 126 Hence, parties to
agreements containing insecurity acceleration clauses within Illinois, or
dealing in Illinois, had no clear foundation upon which to rest their bar-
gaining positions.
121. 15 I11. App. 2d 458, 146 N.E.2d 218 (1957) (published abstract only).
122. Id. at 458, 147 N.E.2d at 218.
123. 147 i. App. 3d 52, 497 N.E.2d 398 (1986).
124. Id. at 59, 497 N.E.2d at 404.
Although the majority states that the court "need not decide which test of good faith under
§ 1-208 should be adopted" because the agreement in question contained an objective standard, id.
at 60, 497 N.E.2d at 404, the court cites ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 26, 1-201(19) (1985) alone as its
reference to § 1-208's standard of good faith. Id. at 59, 497 N.E.2d at 404. The majority also
holds that "we see no reason why the parties' agreement to incorporate a higher standard of good
faith should not be given effect." Id. at 60, 497 N.E.2d at 404. Hence, despite the lack of admis-
sion by the court as to the meaning of good faith, a subjective standard is implicit.
125. 175 Ii. App. 3d 753, 531 N.E.2d 28 (1988).
126. Id. at 756, 531 N.E.2d at 30.
In Watseka, a secured creditor brought an action against the guarantors of the debt. The
guarantors owned approximately one hundred acres of farmland. The principal debtor on the
loan was the guarantor's grandson who farmed Ruda's land. Upon the discovery of a prior lien on
the farmland, the bank accelerated the note. Other reasons given by the bank included a half
interest held by a partner and bad weather conditions. The Watseka court held that the "bank
can not advance as a good faith reason for acceleration of due date the same facts which were the
basis for requiring a guarantor of the loan some five months earlier." Id. at 756, 531 N.E.2d at 31.
The bank did not have a reasonable basis to accelerate the due date of the notes. Id., 531 N.E.2d
at 30.
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A fairer approach would be the one applied by the Colorado Court of
Appeals in Richards Engineers v. Spanel.127 The Richards court held that
"[i]n determining the appropriate standard [for section 1-208 good faith],
we are... guided by pre-Code Colorado case law governing similar transac-
tions. Under such rulings... a determination had to be founded upon good
faith, and the decision had to be based on reasonable grounds and probable
cause."' 28 In addition to the pre-Code versus post-Code case analysis, the
nature of the debtor-creditor relationship reveals the use of a subjective
good faith standard to be inequitable.
b. Debtor-Creditor Relationship
The nature of a debtor-creditor relationship requires that some reasona-
bleness be applied. Acceleration clauses were developed to solve the needs
of both the creditor and the debtor by permitting them to create an obliga-
tion which matured at a fixed date, but was payable earlier upon the hap-
pening of certain prescribed events. 129  In particular, insecurity
acceleration clauses deal with acceleration of debt when events portend the
likelihood of nonperformance. Section 1-208 "recognize[s] that accelera-
tion is a harsh remedy 3 ° which should be allowed only if there is some
reasonable justification for doing so, such as a good faith belief that the
prospect of payment is impaired."'' Mandating that creditors satisfy the
good faith obligation of section 1-208 before accelerating debt fulfills the
expectation of the parties that demand will be made in specific circum-
stances to protect the debtor against nonpayment. 132 Requiring the credi-
tor to prove only a mere honest belief that payment of the obligation was
impaired allows for abuse. The creditor need not act reasonably, but may
127. 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
128. Id. at 1033 (citing Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429, 30 P.2d 863 (1934)).
129. According to Professor Gilmore, "Eflor a hundred years... no security agreement has
failed to include an acceleration clause." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 50, § 43.4, at 1105.
Acceleration clauses are an important and useful tool of creditors. In many cases the creditor
needs to act quickly to protect his investment. E.g., Monson v. Pickett, 253 Minn. 550, 93
N.W.2d 537 (1958) (notice of a "going out of business sale"); Goggins v. Bookout, 141 Mont. 449,
378 P.2d 212 (1963) (action for balance due on note after chattel paper mortgage had been ex-
hausted through prior mortgage foreclosure); State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977) (if
debtor is not caring for his collateral (livestock) any delay may reduce the value of the creditor's
loan).
Such actions can put the value of the collateral out of the secured party's hands forever and
leave him scrambling with unsecured creditors in bankruptcy court.
130. An acceleration clause permits the creditor to make an entire immature debt due imme-
diately so that satisfaction may promptly ensue.
131. Williamson, 545 P.2d at 1149.
132. Note, Standards for Insecurity Acceleration Under Section 1-208 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Proposal for Reform, 13 Mich. J. L. REFORM 632, 638 (1980).
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instead benefit from a mistake of fact, 133 or mistake in judgment.1 3 ' The
subjective good faith test dispenses with terms such as diligence, negligence,
and notice, thereby escaping all aspects of prudent business activity. 135
The speed with which the axe can fall on a debtor whose contract
includes an insecurity clause is illustrated by cases brought under
section 1-208 in which the creditor is the bank where the debtor also
has his checking account. The bank's common law right of set-off
allows it to deem itself insecure, to accelerate, and to pay itself out of
the debtor's checking account .... The bank's swift and silent ac-
tion is lawful although it may push the debtor to bankruptcy. 136
In fact, applying the subjective test of good faith counters the initial inten-
tion of the drafters to impose restrictions on a creditor's power over the
133. See, eg., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Van
Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972).
134. Compare Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 175, 243 S.E.2d 528 (1978)
(The court made a finding of good faith irrespective of a mistake in judgment. The mistake con-
cerned the truthfulness of the debtor's answers on a loan application. Meanwhile, the debtor was
tried and acquitted for the charge.), and Karner v. Willis, 238 Kan. 246, 249 710 P.2d 21, 23-24
(1985) (Herd, J., dissenting) (The bank argued the garnishment of the debtor's bank accounts
would have destroyed the liquidity of the debtor, thereby justifying the bank's acceleration. "This
argument ignores the nature of a secured note. Neither the garnishment nor the foreign judgment
affect the bank's security. As testified to, the bank was satisfied with the security for the [debtor's
obligation]. The garnishment was seeking payment from [the debtor's] unmortgaged assets." id.)
with Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969) (Four months after
receiving a loan, the debtor resigned from the Air Force as a registered nurse. He informed the
Credit Union he was considering moving to Texas to find employment. The Credit Union de-
manded possession of the debtor's car, despite the fact that the debtor had always made prompt
payments and his R.N. license was valid in forty-eight of the fifty states. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that "the Credit Union's determination that it was insecure was certainly errone-
ous; it could hardly have asked for a more conscientious and responsible debtor." Id. at 1373. In
fact, despite the creditor's repossession, the debtor continued to make full payments on his loan to
the Credit Union. Id.).
135. If a creditor is not penalized for accelerating unreasonably, either by mistake in fact or
in judgment, incentive exists for the creditor to exercise sound business judgment when making
his decision.
136. Note, supra note 132, at 632 (citing examples of set-off such as Jensen v. State Bank, 518
F.2d I (8th Cir. 1975); Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975);
Merchant v. Worley, 79 N.M. 771,449 P.2d 787 (1969)); see also Spencer Co. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 81 Bankr. 194 (D. Mass. 1987); Karner, 238 Kan. 246, 710 P.2d 21; First Nat'l Bank
v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
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debtor.'37 Section 1-208 thereby becomes a "sword for commercial gain
rather than... a shield against security impairment.' 138
2. Section 2-609
Section 2-609 13 also supports, by analogy, the adoption of a reasonable-
ness standard for good faith through Code construction. Section 2-609 of
the Uniform Commercial Code addresses performance insecurity whereby
one party may, in writing, demand assurance, or even suspend perform-
ance, upon reasonable grounds of insecurity."4 The comments to this sec-
tion provide:
Clauses seeking to give the protected party exceedingly wide powers
to cancel or readjust the contract when ground for insecurity arises
must be read against the fact that good faith is a part of the obliga-
tion of the contract.., and, in the case of the merchant, the reason-
able observance of commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade.' 4 1
Hence, the good faith performance of demanding assurance, or even halting
performance, on a contract appears to be measured with an objective stan-
dard. Interestingly, the official comment to section 2-609 cross-references
section 1-208 for interpretation and construction. 42
The language of the official comment to section 2-609 makes reference
to "merchant" status. The question then becomes whether a creditor can
hold "merchant" status.
a Merchant
Section 2-104 defines merchant as:
137. The official comment to U.C.C. § 1-208 provides:
This section is intended to make clear that despite language which can be so construed...
void as against public policy ... the clause means that the option is to be exercised only in
the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired .... [thus to
clear up] some confusion in the cases as to the effect to be given to a clause which seem-
ingly grants the power of an acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party.
U.C.C. § 1-208 official comment (1988).
See generally Leaf, Acceleration Clauses in Sales and Secured Transactions: The Debtor's Bur-
den Under Section 1-208 of the U.C.C., 11 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 531 (1970).
138. Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979).
139. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1988).
140. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1988). "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to
the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due per-
formance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any per-
formane ...." Id; see Richards Engineers, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
141. U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1988).
142. Id.
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[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent
or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out as having such knowledge or skill. 143
The official comment to section 2-104 suggests that there are three types of
classifications of merchants:
[1) those] who ... by their occupation hold themselves out as hav-
ing special knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices... involved
in the...
[2) those who are sellers]... with respect to goods of that kind; and
[3) those] who are merchants under either the "practices" or the
"goods" aspect of the definition of merchant. 1"
The comments further suggest that section 2-609 falls under the third clas-
sification, 145 thus qualifying under either subsection 2-104(1) or 2-104(2) (as
shown above). Because section 2-609 does not concern the sale of goods,
but rather a party's "practice" of determining insecurity, "merchant" status
is found under the first classification:
[A]lmost every person in business would be deemed to be a
"merchant" under this language who ... by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices...
involved in the transaction.... In this type of provision banks...
well may be "merchants."' 14
6
143. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1988).
144. U.C.C. § 2-104 official comment 2 (1988). The first classification applies to §§ 2-201(2)
(Statute of Frauds); 2-205 (firm offers); 2-207 (confirmatory memorandum) and 2-209 (modifica-
tion). These aspects of commercial law are familiar to.any person in the business. This category
covers "almost every person in the business world" including banks. The second classification
covers §§ 2-314, 2-402(2), and 2-403(2). Merchant status requires that professional status be held
toward the particular kind of goods. The last classification specifically addresses §§ 2-103(1)(b),
2-327(1)(c), 2-603, 2-509, and 2-609. Merchant status can be acquired under either of the prior
two classifications. Id.
145. Id. In fact, the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-609 uses the same language as § 2-
103(1)(b) also included under the third classification of "merchant."
Compare U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1988) ("[w]hen ground for insecurity arises [it]
must be read against the fact that good faith is a part of the obligation of the contract and.., in
the case of a merchant, the reasonable observance of commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade"(emphasis added)) with U.C.C. § 2-103 (1)(b) (1988) (" 'Good faith' in the case of merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards offair dealing in the
trade." (emphasis added)).
146. U.C.C. § 2-104 official comment 2 (1988) (emphasis added).
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Yet the courts, in applying the good faith obligation to lenders,14 7 almost
without exception148 misapply the general subsection 1-201(19) definition
of good faith without discussion. 149
Assuming, arguendo, that creditor banks can hold "merchant" status
under Article 2, the next issue is whether this objective standard can be
applied outside of Article 2.150 One approach would be to apply by analogy
the objective standard of good faith performance of sales contracts by
merchants."' 1 Professor William H. Lawrence and Professor Robert D.
Wilson1 52 suggest that a lender's performance and enforcement of a loan
agreement, subject to the lender's discretion, is sufficiently analogous to a
merchant's performance and enforcement of a sales contract to support the
integration of the objective standard with the lender's obligation of good
147. Most, if not all of the cases brought under § 1-208 concern banks or some other lending
institution. See, eg., Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975); Sheppard Fed. Credit
Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969); Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App.
175, 243 S.E.2d 528 (1978); Smith v. Union State Bank, 452 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Black v. Peoples Bank
& Trust Co., 437 So.2d 26 (Miss. 1983); McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, 585
P.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978); State Bank v. Woolsey,
565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977).
148. A student commentator found only one case that applied the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade to a bank. See, eg., Branch Banking & Trust
Co. v. Creasy, 44 N.C. App. 289, 293, 260 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 301
N.C. 76 269 S.E.2d 117 (1980) (U.C.C. Article 2 good faith standard for merchants applies to
banks; "[slurely, the standards of good faith of a bank should be no less than those of a
merchant."). Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty
of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 539, 549 n.64 (1987) (authored by Steven Hilfinger).
149. Note, supra note 148, at 549 n.64 (citing Van Bibber v. Norris, 275 Ind. 555, 566, 419
N.E.2d 115, 122 (1981)) (lender not subject to "merchant" definition of good faith).
150. Many commentators argue that the observance of reasonable commercial practices ap-
plies only in Article 2 due to the language in U.C.C. § 2-103(1) which states: (1) "In this Article
unless context otherwise requires ... (b) 'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C.
§ 2-103(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
151. But see, Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 112, at 841. The authors state:
The words "argument by analogy" cannot magically dispense with the statutory language
that limits the objective standard of good faith to Article 2 transactions involving
merchants [citing U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1978)]. Proponents of analogies must formulate a
rationale to demonstrate the appropriateness of the proposed analogy. In this case, the
formulation is even more difficult because, rather than justifying the application of a Code
concept to a transaction outside the scope of the Code, it applies a Code definition beyond
its codified scope. Nevertheless, combined principles of analogy and statutory construction
create persuasive arguments in this area.
Id.
152. William Lawrence is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas. Robert Wilson is a
1988 graduate of the University of Kansas. Both commentators coauthored a law review article in
1988. Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 112.
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faith. 53 The following decision illustrates the similarity in cases involving
sales contracts and those involving loan agreements.
In Ellis Manufacturing Co. v. Brant,154 a breach of contract action was
brought by Ellis Manufacturing Company (Ellis) for nonperformance by
Brant, a general contractor. Ellis contracted to supply and install the cabi-
nets in an apartment complex constructed by Brant. After both parties had
substantially performed their obligations, Ellis demanded collection of all
payments on the contract. When no payments were received, Ellis stopped
performance. The Texas Appellate Court, relying solely on section 2-609,
held that "[i]t cannot be said that Brant's failure to pay was, under the
circumstances, as a matter of law, reasonable grounds for insecurity." '
Both installment sales agreements and loan agreements concern general
contract principles. One party bargains for a payment of money, and the
other bargains for the receipt of goods or services.1 16 In Ellis, Brant was to
receive goods and services (the installation of cabinets) and Ellis was to
receive money. This is no different from a loan transaction. A creditor
bargains for payment of money (interest fee) and the debtor bargains for the
use of that money. An insecurity acceleration clause can be contained in
both.
The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged the similarities between sec-
tion 1-208 and section 2-609 in Kupka v. Morey. 57 Kupka and his wife
operated two corporations- National Aero Sales Corporation and Nasco
Leasing Corporation. The former engaged in the purchase and sale of air-
craft; the latter dealt with leasing aircraft. Morey, signing as a guarantor
on one of the leases, made the initial payment of $3500. After a crash of the
leased aircraft, the parties entered into a subsequent agreement. Morey
leased and then subleased the plane for two months. An insurance policy
had been taken out by Kupka naming the sublessee as an additional in-
sured. This policy lapsed. Kupka then repossessed the airplane despite the
fact the Morey had been paid in full. The Alaska Supreme Court held that
"as a minimum requirement for the enforcement of such [insecurity clause]
.. the party invoking the clause must reasonably and in good faith believe
that the prospect of payment or performance has somehow been im-
153. See id. at 841.
154. 480 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
155. Id. at 304.
156. Article 2 covers the sale and disposition of "goods." It is beyond the scope of this
Comment to examine the controversy of determining whether mixed contracts of goods and serv-
ices fall within the scope of Article 2.
157. 541 P.2d 740 (Alaska 1975).
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paired.... Kupka's repossession of the plane was neither reasonable nor in
good faith." 158
Transactions governed by Article 2 concern those within a trade context
in which reasonable commercial standards exist. Consequently, the "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing within the trade"
is an obvious standard. Lending and financial institutions also hold them-
selves out to be professionals in commercial transactions:
The proposition that they should not be held to observe reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing within the lending and financ-
ing trade is untenable. To the extent that such standards exist
within the requisite trade, the same policies that support their re-
quired observance by merchants apply with equal force to lenders
and other financing enterprises.15 9
A recent First Circuit case suggests that the "merchant" definition of
good faith may apply outside of Article 2.1 0 In Reid v. Key Bank of South-
ern Maine,'6' Depositors Trust Company of Southern Maine (Key Bank's
predecessor in interest) granted Reid an extensive line of credit in mid-1975.
Less than four years later, Depositors halted any further advance on this
line of credit. At trial, the judge gave a series of jury instructions contain-
ing both subjective and objective components. 162 Yet the court held that
"even if we agreed with [the] defendant [Key Bank] that the Maine courts
would limit an objective standard for good faith to article 2 cases, we would
not find a fatal error in the judge's instructions here."' 63  Section 2-609
addresses a party's grounds for insecurity in demanding performance under
a contract which resembles the insecurity acceleration clauses governed by
section 1-208. The major difference between sections 2-609 and 1-208 rests
in the consequences after a party deems himself insecure - a written de-
158. Id. at 747 (footnotes omitted) (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-609, 1-208).
159. Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 112, at 841.
160. See Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987).
Contra Van Bibber v. Norris, 275 Ind. 555, 556, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1981) (The fact that
lenders are under no burden to observe reasonable commercial standards "reflects the Code draft-
ers' recognition that sales transactions are more amenable to establishment of 'reasonable com-
mercial standards' than are the relations between secured parties and debtors"); Warren, Good
Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 EMERGING THEORiEs OF LENDER LIABILrrY 58
(H. Chaitman ed. 1985) (sponsored by the American Bar Association Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law and the Section of Litigation) (Indeed, a lender is not a merchant and
is not generally bound to observe "reasonable commercial standards"). See also Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 765 (1963); Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 112, at 834.
161. 821 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1987).
162. For an examination of the confusion presented by the jury instructions in Reid, see supra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
163. Reid, 821 F.2d at 15.
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mand of assurance versus the acceleration of an entire debt. Indeed, to hold
a creditor to a less stringent standard under section 1-208, rather than what
is afforded merchants under section 2-609, is inconsistent.
3. Section 1-203
The third source for support of an objective standard of good faith in
section 1-208 is section 1-203.1"4 Section 1-203 states that "[e]very contract
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance or enforcement."' 165 The official comments to section 1-203 provide
particular sections of the Code to which this general principle applies: sec-
tion 1-208 (option to accelerate at will); section 2-508 (right to cure a defec-
tive delivery of goods); section 2-603 (duty of merchant who has rejected
goods to effect salvage operations); section 2-614 (substituted performance);
and section 2-615 (failure of presupposed conditions).'66 Each of the afore-
mentioned sections, except section 1-208, expressly requires reasonable
grounds for performance, 67 thereby implicitly couching section 1-203's
standard in "reasonable" terms. Additionally, other Code comments sug-
164. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988). The relationship between § 1-208 and § 1-203 remains uncer-
tain. While some courts treat the two sections as distinct inquiries, a Texas appellate court con-
cluded that § 1-208 is a specific application of § 1-203. Compare Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis
Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980) (holding that § 1-203 and § 1-208
are separate, unrelated inquiries), with Jack M. Finley v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 705 S.W.2d
206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (§ 1-203 held to include secured transactions which are governed by § 1-
208).
See Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L. REv. 1181, 1183 n.14 (1988)
(authored by Paul Jones.).
165. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
166. Official comment to U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
167. Section 1-203 of the Code, like § 1-208, is applicable in every transaction subject to Code
coverage. Hence, good faith is statutorily required in every secured transaction, in every sales
action, and with the use of any negotiable instrument. The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 1-203
mention only a few sections of the Code:
U.C.C. § 2-508(2) provides:
Where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller had reasonable grounds
to believe would be acceptable... the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a
further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
U.C.C. § 2-603 states:
(1) . .. [A] merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection of goods in his possession... to
follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller.., and in the absence of such
instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them ....
(2) [W]hen the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to reimbursement
from the seller ... for reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them.
(3) In complying with this section the buyer is held only to good faith ...
U.C.C. § 2-603 (1988) (emphasis added).
U.C.C. § 2-614 requires that:
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gest that the objective standard in observance of commercial practices ap-
plies to section 1-203.168 Although comments are not considered part of the
statutory language of each Code section, 169 the Code's chief draftsperson,
Llewellyn, indicated:
I am ashamed of it in some ways; there are so many pieces that I
could make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to
get in that would have been good for the law, but I was voted
down.... When we weren't allowed to put it in where we wanted to
go, ... we at least got the thing set up so that we are allowed to state
in accompanying comments where the particular sections are trying
to go. 1
70
A recent bankruptcy case recognized the need for an objective standard
utilizing section 1-103. In In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 71 a bank
representative simply appeared one day at the debtor's place of business,
foreclosed on the collateral and proceeded to change the locks. This action
came without notice to the debtor. In fact, the debtor believed that the
bank was going to approve a pending loan application. No default was
proven. The bank merely reacted to the existence of the involvement of a
shareholder in organized crime. 72 Without invoking section 1-208's inse-
Where... the agreed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail or an agreed type of
carrier becomes unavailable... but a commercially reasonable substitute is available, such
substitute performance must be tendered and accepted.
U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
U.C.C. § 2-615 states that:
[a] [dlelay in delivery or nondelivery... by a seller.., is not a breach of his duty under a
contract for sale if performance ... has been made impracticable... by compliance in
good faith with any applicable... regulation ....
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1988).
The official comments to section 2-615 allow:
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article [may be] ... necessary, especially
the sections on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions
in the light of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles
in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
U.C.C. § 2-615 official comment 6 (1988).
168. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) official comment 19 (1988); § 1-203 official comment 1 (1988);
U.C.C. § 2-209 official comment 2 (1988); U.C.C. § 2-609 official comment 6 (1988); U.C.C. § 2-
612 official comments 3, 7 (1988); Summers, supra note 112, at 212 n. 65.
But see id. at 212-13. There is little justification in the text for this interpretation, and several
of the relevant comments can be explained away as addressed to earlier versions of the Code in
which good faith in section 1-201(19) was broadly defined both for purposes of § 1-203 and for
specific provisions throughout the Code.
169. Hart, supra note 93, at 42.
170. Summers, supra note 112, at 213 n.66 (citing Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22
TENN. L. REV. 779, (1953)).
171. 87 Bankr. 752 (1988).
172. Id. at 757, 760.
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curity acceleration law, the bankruptcy court found that the creditor had
violated its obligation of good faith in its performance of the contract. The
United States Bankruptcy Court held that Massachusetts courts, as estab-
lished by precedent, 17 3 recognize and apply an objective standard under
general contract law. 174 Therefore, if an objective standard can be applied
to section 1-203 for general contract performance, it must also be required
to satisfy section 1-208 - a particular application of section 1-203 by direct
reference within the section's language.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Nature n'a cree' l'homme que preter of emprunter."175
As long as there is lending and borrowing, laws are needed to govern
such transactions. As one can readily see, there exists a tremendous need
for a uniform standard of good faith in applying insecurity clauses if equity
is to be achieved. That standard must be measured in objective terms. The
distinction that developed between good faith performance and purchase
mandates an objective application. What at first glance appeared as a fatal
misjudgment by the drafters in defining the general standard of good faith
in objective terms, can be rationalized in the application of equitable princi-
ples in section 1-103 and given reasonable meaning under Code construc-
tion of sections 2-609 and 1-203. As one judge stated: "Good faith in law
... is not to be measured always by a man's own standard of right, but that
which it has adopted and prescribed as a standard for the observance of all
men in their dealings with each other."
' 176
SUSAN A. WEGNER
173. See Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102-05, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-58
(1977) (The court's holding of bad faith was not based upon the employer's deceit or lack of
candor when terminating the employee plaintiff under an "at will" contract, but rather was based
upon the unfairness when the employee was on the edge of successful completion of a sale entitling
him to full commission.); see also Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 834 Mass. 659, 667, 429 N.E.2d
21, 26 (1981), damages reconsidered, 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796 (1984); Zapatha v. Diary
Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 291, 408 N.E.2d 1378, n.16 (1980).
174. Martin, 87 Bankr. at 776.
175. Nature has created man to no other end but to lend and borrow. RABELAIS, WORKS,
book iii ch.4.
176. First Nat'l Bank v. F.C. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 325, 52 N.E. 834, 837 (1898).
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